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 The Emergence of Consciousness
William Seager
I. Varieties of Consciousness
When we speak of consciousness, or being conscious or modes of consciousness, 
there is a huge multitude of phenomena to which we could be referring. It is not 
completely obvious that there is any one thing that stands as the core referent 
of all our different ways of talking about consciousness (see Wilkes 1988). 
But it is important to distinguish the field of consciousness from mentality in 
general. Ever since Freud, and Helmholtz somewhat before him, the concept 
of unconscious mental states has seemed quite unproblematic, despite the 
previous widespread opinion that the idea was completely incoherent. Freud’s 
innovation depends upon noticing that some mental states have a distinctive 
role in the etiology of behavior that is seemingly independent of consciousness. 
Roughly speaking, this role is to cause behavior so that it is susceptible to 
“rationalizing” explanation.
By this term I do not mean that the explained behavior is in itself rational 
but that it is rationally understandable in relation to some set of beliefs and 
desires attributed to the agent. Freud, for example, explains why a woman 
misspoke by means of a little story the upshot of which was that the woman 
was “under the influence of unconscious thoughts concerning pregnancy and 
the prevention of conception” (1938, 74). Or again, a woman dreams that 
her plans for a dinner party are wrecked when she realizes (in the dream) that 
there is no food to serve the guests. Freud “discovers” that the dream reflects 
the woman’s jealousy of a friend who she knows her husband greatly admires 
but who – luckily – her husband regards as too thin. Obviously, she does not 
want her friend to gain weight and hence dreams that she will not be feeding 
her (1938, 226). None of this is very rational (nor very plausible either of 
course) but the link between the postulated unconscious beliefs and desires 
makes sense to us.
Something of the same underlying rationalizing structure can be seen in 
the inferential theory of perception of Hermann Helmholtz in which various 
aspects of visual perception, including various forms of illusory perception, are 
explained in terms of there being an underlying set of “premises” or assumptions 
about the usual conditions of perception from which, along with current sensory 
input, our perceptual systems “deduce” what we are seeing. An example might 
be the use of Emmert’s Law to explain the moon illusion (which is the way 
the moon looks bigger when it is near the horizon than when it is overhead). 
Emmert’s law says that the perceived size of an object varies with the perceived 
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distance. If we suppose that the moon looks further away when near the horizon 
(perhaps because it is clearly behind everything on the horizon) than when 
it is overhead (and cannot be compared to anything else), then Emmert’s law 
predicts that the moon will be perceived as larger when on the horizon. But 
we are certainly not conscious of any such cognitive mechanism within us so 
presumably our perceptual system is unconsciously processing information in 
a way that is rational1.
This kind of rational structure of belief, desire and behavior evidently does not 
require any consciousness of the mental states involved. It is now commonplace 
and legitimate for us to invoke such unconscious states, both in everyday life 
and throughout research in the “mental sciences”. This naturally puts some 
pressure on the idea that consciousness has an essential role in the generation 
of behavior, which in turn has led some to raise the specter of “consciousness 
inessentialism”: the view that any behavior which is mediated by consciousness 
could occur in the absence of consciousness (see Flanagan 1992, ch. 7). In 
general, the information processing which underlies the system of belief and 
desire-mediated generation of behavior appears capable of operation in the 
absence of consciousness. Already artifacts such as chess playing computers 
have at least simulations of beliefs (about the current position of the pieces and 
their relative value) and desires (as encoded in the global goal of checkmate 
and a host of local goals involved in the incremental improvement of position 
as the game proceeds). The “actions” of chess computers are highly susceptible 
to rationalizing explanation within the confines of the chess world. It is natural 
and useful to describe them in ways such as: the computer took the pawn in 
order to threaten my knight.
But even if we restrict ourselves to mental states that are conscious or 
involve consciousness, the range of phenomena remains immense. When 
we think about consciousness we may have in mind highly complex mental 
activities such as reflective self-consciousness or introspective consciousness, 
of which perhaps only human beings are capable. Or we may be thinking about 
something more purely phenomenal, perhaps something as apparently simple 
and unitary as a momentary stab of pain. Paradigm examples of consciousness are 
the perceptual states of seeing and hearing, but the nature of the consciousness 
involved is actually complex and far from clear. Are the conscious elements of 
perception made up only of “raw” sensations from which we construct objects 
of perception in a quasi-intellectual operation? Or is perceptual consciousness 
always of “completed” objects with their worldly properties?
The realm of consciousness is hardly exhausted by its reflective, introspective 
or perceptual forms. There is distinctively emotional consciousness, which 
seems to necessarily involve both bodily feelings and some kind of cognitive 
assessment. Emotional states require a kind of evaluation of a situation. Does 
consciousness thus include distinctive evaluative states, so that, for example, 
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consciousness of pain would involve both distinctive bodily sensations and a 
conscious “sense” of aversion? Linked closely with emotional states are familiar, 
but nonetheless rather peculiar, states of consciousness that are essentially 
other-directed, notably empathy and sympathy. We visibly wince when others 
are hurt and almost seem to feel pain ourselves as we undergo this unique kind 
of experience.
Philosophers argue about whether all thinking is accompanied by or perhaps 
even constituted out of sensory materials (images have been the traditional 
favorite candidate material), and some champion the idea of a pure thought-
consciousness independent of sensory components. In any event, there is no 
doubt that thought is something that often happens consciously and is in some 
way different from perception, sensation or other forms of consciousness.
Yet another sort of conscious experience is closely associated with the idea 
of conscious thought but is not identical to it: epistemological consciousness, 
or the sense of certainty or doubt we have when consciously entertaining a 
proposition (such as ‘2 + 3 = 5’ or ‘the word “eat” consists of three letters’). 
Descartes famously appealed to such states of consciousness in the “method 
of doubt” (see his Meditations 1641/1985).
Still another significant if subtle form of consciousness has sometimes been 
given the name “fringe” consciousness (see Mangan 2001, following James 1890, 
ch. 9), which refers to the “background” of awareness that sets the context for 
experience. An example is our sense of orientation or “rightness” in a familiar 
environment (consider the change in your state of consciousness when you 
recognize someone’s face who at first appeared a stranger). Sometimes the 
oddity of dreams consists in what ought to be a familiar situation experienced 
without the normal sense of orientation. Moods present another form of fringe 
consciousness, with clear links to the more’“overtly” conscious emotional states 
but also clearly distinct from these.
Despite the large diversity in this sample of the forms of consciousness, 
there is a fundamental common feature that they all share. Consciousness is 
distinctive for its subjectivity or its “first-person” character. There is “something 
it is like” to be in a conscious state, and only the conscious subject has direct 
access to this way of being (see Nagel 1974). There is nothing it is like to be 
a rock, no subjective aspect to an ashtray. But conscious beings are essentially 
different in this respect. Every case given above has its own peculiar but 
accessible subjective form. This is the hard core of what we mean when we 
think about the nature of consciousness. And as we’ll see, it is this common 
feature of conscious mental states that makes the emergence of consciousness 
both mysterious and problematic.
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II. The Place of Consciousness in Nature
There is no “problem” of consciousness until we come to see it as surprising 
or unexpected relative to some favored explanatory framework. The most 
powerful explanatory framework ever devised is that of empirical science. Why 
is consciousness and its emergence a special problem for science? To see this, 
consider what I think can be fairly characterized as the orthodox view of the 
structure and development of the universe, beginning with the rather grand 
scheme provided by the science of cosmology. I’ll call this general picture the 
mainstream view and it goes something like the following.
The world is a purely physical system created some 13 billion years ago in 
the prodigious event Fred Hoyle derisively labeled the big bang. Very shortly 
after the big bang the world was in a primitive, ultra-hot and chaotic state in 
which normal matter could not exist, but as the system cooled the familiar 
elements of hydrogen and helium, as well as some traces of a few heavier 
elements, began to form (this opening act takes up some 300,000 years). Then 
very interesting things started to happen, as stars and galaxies quickly evolved, 
burned through their hydrogen fuel and went nova, in the process creating and 
spewing forth most of the elements of the periodic table into the increasingly 
rich galactic environments.
There was not the slightest trace of life, mind or consciousness throughout 
any of this. That was to come later. The mainstream view continues with the 
creation of planetary systems. At first these were poor in heavier elements, but 
after just a few generations of star creation and destruction there were many 
earth-like planets scattered through the vast – perhaps infinite – expanse of 
galaxies, and indeed some 7 or 8 billion years after the big bang the earth itself 
formed along with our solar system.
We do not yet understand it very well, but whether in a warm little pond, 
around a deeply submerged hydrothermal vent, amongst the complex interstices 
of some claylike matrix, as a pre-packaged gift from another world, or in some 
other way of which we have no inkling, conditions on the early earth somehow 
enabled the rather special – though entirely in accord with physical law–– 
chemistry necessary for the beginnings of life.
But even with the presence of life or proto-life, consciousness still did not grace 
the earth. The long, slow processes of evolution by natural selection took hold 
and ultimately led at some time, somewhere to the first living beings that could 
feel – could feel pain and pleasure, want and fear, could experience sensations 
of light, sound or odors. The mainstream view sees this radical development 
as being conditioned by the evolution of neurological behavior control 
systems in co-evolutionary development with more capable sensory systems. 
Consciousness thus emerged as a product of increasing biological complexity, 
from non-conscious precursors composed of non-conscious components.
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On this view it seems obvious that there would be a vanishingly small 
difference between the last, as it were, non-conscious organism and the first 
conscious one. So one problem with the emergence of consciousness is to identify 
the physical change that provides the basis for this momentous transition. A 
fanciful way to put the issue is to imagine that we were alien exo-biologists 
observing the earth around the time of the emergence of consciousness. How 
would we know that certain organisms were, while other organisms were not, 
conscious? What is it about the conscious organisms that explains why they 
are conscious? Furthermore, the appearance of conscious beings looks to be 
a development that sharply distinguishes them from their precursors, but the 
material processes of evolution are not marked by such radical discontinuities. 
To be sure, we do find striking differences amongst extant organisms. The unique 
human use of language is perhaps the best example of such a difference, but of 
course the apes exhibit a host of related, potentially precursor abilities, as do 
human beings who lack full language use. Thus we have possible models of at 
least some aspects of our pre-linguistic ancestors that suggest the evolutionary 
path that led to language.
But the slightest, most fleeting, spark of feeling is a full-fledged instance of 
consciousness that entirely differentiates its possessor from the realm of the 
non-conscious. Note here a striking dissimilarity to other biological features. 
Some creatures have wings and others do not, and we would expect that in 
the evolution from wingless to winged there would be a hazy region where it 
just would not be clear whether or not a certain creature’s appendages would 
count as wings. Similarly, as we consider the evolutionary advance from non-
conscious to conscious creatures, there would be a range for which we would be 
unclear about whether or not creatures within that range were conscious. But 
in this latter case, there is a fact whether or not the creatures in that range are 
feeling anything, however’“dimly” or “weakly,” whereas we do not think there 
must be a fact about whether a certain appendage is or is not a wing (a dim or 
faint feeling is 100% a kind of consciousness but a few feathers on a forelimb is 
not a kind of wing). It is up to us whether to count a certain sort of appendage 
as a wing or not – it makes no difference, so to speak, to the organism what 
we call it. But it is not up to us to decide whether or not organism X does or 
does not enjoy some smidgen of consciousness – it either does or it does not.
The abstract and general, perhaps metaphysical, question lurking in the 
background here links to the issue noted above of conscious inessentialism. 
Given that creatures capable of fairly complex behavior were evolving without 
consciousness, why is consciousness necessary for the continued evolution of 
more complex behavior? Just as wings are an excellent solution to the problem 
of evolving flight, brains (or more generally nervous systems) are wonderful at 
implementing richly capable sensory systems and co-ordinated behavior control 
systems. But why should these brains be conscious? Although perhaps of doubtful 
6
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 36 [2006], No. 1, Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol36/iss1/3
6 x 9
10   William Seager
coherence, it’s useful to try to imagine our alien biologists as non-conscious 
beings. Perhaps they are advanced machines well programmed in deduction, 
induction and abduction. Now, why would they ever posit consciousness in 
addition to, or as a feature of, the increasingly complex sensory and behavioral 
control systems they find in their examination of Earth? Thomas Huxley once 
said: “how it is that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness comes 
about as a result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable as the 
appearance of Djin when Aladdin rubbed his lamp” (1866, 8, 210). We might, 
rather fancifully, describe this core philosophical question about consciousness 
as that of how the genie of consciousness gets into the lamp of the brain, or 
why, to use Thomas Nagel’s (1974) famous phrase, there ever is in the world 
“something it is like” to be some entity?
The mainstream view implicitly appeals to a view of the world that is 
hierarchical or structured in layers of complexity but in which the complex 
is a determinate function of the simple. We can try to articulate this idea in 
terms of three interlocking principles that I call completeness, closure and 
resolution. Completeness is the doctrine that everything in the world is physical 
and as such abides by closure and resolution. Closure entails that there are 
no “outside forces” – everything that happens, happens in accordance with 
fundamental physical laws so as to comply with resolution. Resolution requires 
that every process or object be resolvable into elementary features that are, by 
completeness, physical and whose abidance with laws governing these features 
leads to closure.
Take anything you like: a galaxy, a person, a flounder, an atom, an economy 
– it seems that anything can be resolved into the fundamental physical 
constituents, processes and events which determine its activity. Indeed, our 
best theory of the creation of the universe maintains that at very early times 
after the big bang the universe was quite literally resolved into its elementary 
constituents; at that time the universe consisted of an extremely hot, highly 
active “sea” of quarks, leptons and elementary force exchange bosons. It is 
important, however, to distinguish the mainstream view – and completeness, 
closure and resolution – from simple mechanism or part-whole reductionism. 
We are now told that the fundamental physical features of the world involve 
non-mechanistic processes and that the properties of quantum mechanical 
systems are not straightforward functions of the local properties of their parts. 
But such bizarre properties as quantum entanglement were predicted by quantum 
mechanics based upon purely physical considerations and are themselves 
elements of the fundamental physics of the world.
Completeness, closure and resolution and their inter-relations are concisely 
expressed in the thought that the universe is “running” entirely and solely upon 
the interactions of these elementary constituents no less today than when it 
was 10-37 seconds old. It’s worth pausing to think about this. Of course the 
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universe is very different today than it was the instant after creation, but the 
mainstream view is committed to this claim. There just aren’t any other forces 
and their aren’t any other constituents.
The crucial difference between that early time and now is the absence of 
high level structure. From an explanatory point of view, nothing would be 
gained by trying to impose any high level theory onto the initial chaos (this 
is not quite true, a certain very abstract high level theory already applied: 
thermodynamics). That is why, in fact, we can have a pretty fair characterization 
of the universe very shortly after its creation despite it being the case that the 
“number” of interactions per femtosecond, so to speak, was no less then than 
it is now and probably very much greater. It seems that the only change from 
then to the present is the creation of structure which admits of high level 
explanatory description, but it is very doubtful that, at bottom, the world is 
any less “running on physics” now than it was then.
This seems to me the heart of the issue of emergence. Do high level structures 
contribute to the “go” of the universe (to use Morgan’s (1923) evocative term), 
or are they merely explanatory aids imposed onto the world by us? Of course, 
there is no doubt that high level structure exists; it is, for example, a plain 
fact that there are trees in the world. And, seeing they predate us by millions 
of years, if there were no people about there still would be trees. High level 
structure is obviously an important feature of our universe. It is perhaps an 
amazing fact that the basic features of our world permit the emergence of high 
level structure. Perhaps if we conceive vast multitudes of universes each of 
which obey our most basic physical laws, differing only in ways permitted by 
those laws, only an infinitesimal fraction would allow for high level structure. 
That would be an interesting and significant fact. But it would not by itself 
suggest that high level structure adds to the causal powers of the world. What 
it seems to add is the possibility of new explanatory approaches to the world 
which exploit the existence of high level structure. In fact, it seems that the 
possibility of imposing such explanatory order on the world is definitive of 
high level structure.
III. Forms of Emergence
The most trivial and unobjectionable definition of emergence is simple 
novelty. If some entity has a property that its constituents lack then that property 
can be called “emergent”. The liquidity of water is an emergent according to 
this definition. Somewhat embarrassingly however, while having mass is not an 
emergent feature, having a mass of 10 kg seems to be, since presumably none of 
the constituents of a 10 kg brick themselves weigh 10 kg. But no matter how 
we avoid these minor peccadilloes, it seems clear that consciousness is going 
to count as an emergent according to the novelty conception of emergence. 
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But is that enough?
In the first place, a lot of novel emergents are predictable given information 
about the constituents of the system in question. The bizarre property of 
superfluidity exhibited by liquid helium (and other so-called Bose-Einstein 
condensates) is highly novel but predicted by quantum mechanics. One of the 
most bewitching examples of this kind of emergence derives from what are 
called cellular automata. You are probably familiar with at least one CA, John 
Conway’s “game of life”. But since Daniel Dennett says that every philosopher 
should study it closely, let me review it briefly here. A CA is a grid or lattice of 
“elements” which can have various abstract properties that change according 
to strict rules of succession that depend upon the state of a given element 
and its neighbors in the lattice. The game of life has its own particular rules, 
which assign to each element or “cell” of the lattice one of two states, labeled 
“alive” and “dead” according to rules that govern how the lattice changes from 
generation to generation. The rules of life are:
(1) Any cell which is alive and has either 2 or 3 living neighbors 
remains alive.
(2) Any cell which is alive and has 4 or more living neighbors dies.
(3) Any cell which is alive and has 1 or fewer living neighbors dies.
(4) Any cell which is dead but which has exactly 3 living neighbors 
becomes alive.
Some features of life are obvious. An initial lattice consisting of only dead 
cells will remain totally dead forever. A small amount of thought reveals that 
three live cells in a row or column will perpetually switch between the row 
and column orientation (the two end cells die, the middle cell remains and 
the dead cells adjacent to the middle cell become alive since they have three 
living neighbors). Some simple patterns will remain forever unchanging, such 
as a 2x2 box (each cell in the box has exactly three living neighbors). Some 
simple patterns reproduce themselves over a few generations while in the 
process moving across the lattice (the simplest is the glider)2.
But in general it is very hard to tell what is going to happen given some 
initial arrangements of living and dead cells. It turns out, in fact, that it is 
impossible for there to be any way to predict in advance how an arbitrary initial 
condition will evolve. All we can do is let the setup evolve and observe the 
outcome. This is because of a remarkable mathematical fact about the game of 
life: it is “Turing complete”, which means that any computable function can 
be implemented by some life configuration or, to put the same point another 
way, any Turing machine can be simulated in some life configuration. Turing’s 
most famous theorem was that it is in general impossible to compute whether a 
given Turing machine will halt or not (for a certain input) and this impossibility 
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translates directly to the game of life given the latter’s Turing completeness 
(see Bedau 1997).
Does that make the structures of the game of life unpredictable in a way that 
makes them emergent in a stronger sense than mere novelty? I don’t think so. 
It seems uncontroversial that simulatability is a mode of predictability. Our 
weather predictions nowadays are directly based upon computer simulations and 
while it may not be mathematically provable that there is no way to analytically 
solve the weather equations for a given initial condition, it is quite beyond 
the realm of any practical feasibility. Weather is, in effect, predictable only by 
simulation (and, of course, not very accurately predictable even by our most 
powerful supercomputers).
One of the classical emergentists – C. D. Broad–– was acutely aware of the 
issue of practical computability long before anyone dreamed of the possibility 
of computer based simulations of natural processes. Thus he deployed the 
fiction of a mathematician of immense powers. As Broad put it (perhaps 
poking some fun at the famous physicist’s weakness in mathematics), the point 
is to “bring out the logical distinction between mechanism and emergence. 
Let us replace Sir Ernest Rutherford by a mathematical archangel, and pass 
on” (1925, 70). Our computers do not yet aspire to angelic status, but we can 
imagine computational systems that are not burdened with the limitations of 
time and space. Let them have as much memory as needed and as much time. 
The issue ought only to be what can be simulated based upon the putatively 
fundamental description of the system at issue.
The game of life is of course simulatable in this sense. And it gives us no 
kind of emergence beyond that of trivial or predictable novelty. Nothing ever 
happens in the life world that would not show up in a computer simulation 
of that world. Perhaps this robs the example of all significance, because the 
abstract structure of cellular automata does not seem to be any kind of a model 
of the physics of the real world. It’s worth pausing to note that this claim is 
not universally accepted.
It has sometime been conjectured that the ultimate foundation of the 
actual world is a cellular automaton (or cellular automaton-like) system (see 
Wolfram 2002 for some recent speculation; the first person to investigate this 
idea may have been Konrad Zuse 1969; the most actual work on the idea 
seems to be that of Edward Fredkin). The general program of modeling the 
world at its most fundamental level as a cellular automaton is called “digital 
physics” or, more provocatively, “finite nature” by Fredkin. The scale at which 
this hypothetical cellular automaton , “computes” the universe (let’s call it 
the ultimate cellular automaton or UCA)  would be very much smaller than 
even subatomic dimensions, probably approaching the Planck length (about 
10-35
 
meters). In fact, there is no particular reason to suppose that the UCA 
works in what we call space. The neighborhoods around the cells of a CA are 
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purely abstract. We might thus hope that space, and time as well, are no less 
emergent features of the world than its more ponderable denizens. This would 
be an amazing vindication of Leibniz’s old idea that the radically non-spatial 
monads’ systems of perception generate the relational structure we call space. 
Time is perhaps a more problematic emergent for Leibniz since the monads 
themselves seem to evolve against a temporal background, but perhaps we 
can go so far as to consider the “instantaneous” (or infinitesimally temporally 
extended) states of all possible monads as the fundamental entities of the 
universe. Then time itself will appear as a special set of relations amongst these 
states (such an idea has been explored in the context of more standard physics 
by Julian Barbour 2001). Then instead of saying that the UCA operates at a 
length scale of about the Planck length, we should say that it is at that length 
that the universe would give clear evidence that it is the product of a CA. 
Unfortunately, experiments that could probe such a length scale are hard to 
imagine, but hopefully as digital physics is developed some experimentally 
accessible implications will emerge. Otherwise the doctrine can only remain 
pure metaphysics, albeit mathematical metaphysics.
No one knows how or if digital physics will pan out. The core problem is to 
link some CA architecture to the physics we already know. As Fredkin puts it: 
“the RUCA [reversible universal cellular automaton] runs a computation. As a 
consequence of that process and of appropriate initial conditions, various stable 
structures will exist in the lattice. For each such stable structure, we expect 
that its behavior will mimic the behavior of some particle such as a muon or 
a photon. What we demand of a correct model is that the behavior of those 
particles obeys the laws of physics and that we can identify the particles of 
the RUCA with the particles of physics” (Fredkin 2003, p. 192). The particles 
(and fields and everything else for that matter) of standard physics would all 
be emergent entities. The task of establishing how standard physics can be 
linked to some RUCA is immensely difficult and not yet very far advanced.
It might be thought that the continuous mathematics of the calculus, 
which serves as the basic mode of description for all our basic theories, and 
which has been applied with huge success throughout all domains of science, 
precludes any serious interpretation of the world as based upon the digital and 
discrete workings of a cellular automaton. After all, according to standard 
formulations of physics, many systems are capable of instantiating an infinite 
and continuous range of states (e.g. the position of a particle can take on any 
real number value). The situation is not so clear-cut however. It is possible to 
demonstrate rigorously that some CA systems generate behavior asymptotically 
describable in continuous terms. For example, the Navier-Stokes equations 
governing hydrodynamical flow can be retrieved from so-called lattice gas 
models that are types of CA (see Frisch et. al. 1986). Of course, I emphasize 
that no one knows whether all of continuous physics can thus be retrieved 
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or approximated from a CA model, but no one knows otherwise either (see 
Fredkin 2003, 2004). It is important to bear in mind that the “space” of the 
CA lattice is not the space of our physical universe (as deployed in scientific 
theory) and the time-tick of the CA is not the time we measure or experience. 
So the mere fact that the space and time of the CA are discrete does not rule 
them out even if we grant that the best scientific description of our space and 
time makes them continuous quantities.
The weird behavior of some quantum systems, in which two particles that have 
interacted maintain a kind of link across any distance so that interaction with 
one will instantaneously affect the state of the other, is called “entanglement” 
(the literature on what Einstein called “spooky action at a distance” is immense; 
see Mermin 1990; Hughes 1992, especially ch. 6). But, again, it is far from 
clear that this is a real problem for digital physics and for the same reason. 
The spatial distance separating the “parts” of an entangled system that makes 
entanglement seem “weird” need not be reflected in the underlying workings 
of our hypothetical universal CA. In fact, could it be that the phenomenon of 
quantum entanglement is trying to tell us that what we call spatial separation 
is not necessarily a “real” separation at the fundamental level of interaction?
The point of this digression is to emphasize that it remains an open possibility 
that the fundamental physics of our world could be CA-like. If so, then all the 
emergence there is in our world is just the kind of emergence found in the life 
world. And that is no more than trivial novelty.
But perhaps it is rather more likely that fundamental physics is not based 
upon cellular automata. Of course, that does not entail the existence of some 
form of emergence beyond trivial novelty. In fact, so long as the lynchpin 
principles of the mainstream view: completeness, closure and resolution are 
endorsed, it is hard to see how there can be any other kind of emergence. This 
claim may seem to be in tension with the undeniable existence of hierarchical 
structure in nature, as discussed above. Is there a real distinction between 
the expression of complex combinatory powers of low level entities which 
entirely stem from low level properties, and genuine emergence – an emergence 
which goes beyond trivial novelty? Or again, is there any real content to the 
purported distinction between the explanatory usefulness of high level structural 
accounts and the causal powers of high level structure? I think there is, but to 
see it requires focusing on the mainstream view as a metaphysical rather than 
a methodological or epistemological doctrine. We are not concerned with 
obtaining a practical understanding of everything in terms of full resolution. 
In fact, such understanding is quite impossible, for reasons of complexity 
that the mainstream view itself can spell out and fully expects to encounter. 
Innumerable immensely difficult questions arise at every stage of resolution, 
and there is no practical prospect whatsoever of knowing the full details of the 
physical resolution of even very simple physical complexes.
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IV. The Superduper Computer Thought Experiment
The metaphysical picture is nonetheless clear. And since the world has no 
need to know the details but just runs along because the details are the way 
they are, the problems we have understanding complex systems in terms of 
fundamental physics are quite irrelevant to the metaphysics of the mainstream 
view. So, leaving aside issues of verifiability, let us take flight on the wings of 
imagination and engage in a purely philosophical thought experiment.
Imagine the day when physics is complete. A theory is in place that unifies 
all the forces of nature in one self-consistent and empirically verified set of 
absolutely basic principles. Of course, the mere possession of this theory of 
everything will not give us the ability to provide a complete explanation of 
everything: every event, process, occurrence and structure. Most things will 
be too remote from the basic theory to admit of explanation in its terms; even 
relatively small and simple systems will be far too complex to be intelligibly 
described in the final theory. But we are interested here in the ontological 
aspect of causation, not the explanatory side.
Seeing as our imagined theory is fully developed and mathematically complete 
it will enable us to set up detailed computer simulations of physical systems. 
The range of practicable simulations will in fact be subject to pretty much the 
same constraints facing the explanatory use of the theory; the modeling of even 
very simple systems will require impossibly large amounts of computational 
resources.
But consider a thought experiment that flatly ignores the inevitably 
insuperable problems of computational reality. Imagine a computer model of 
the final physical theory operating under “relaxed computational constraints”: 
the simulation has no computational limits (we can deploy as much memory as 
we like and compute for as long as we like). Imagine that detailed specifications 
of the basic physical configuration of any system are available, so that if 
the configuration of any physical system is specified (to any given degree of 
accuracy) as input then the subsequent states of the system can be calculated 
(to a specified degree of accuracy). If the final theory is non-deterministic then 
we can permit multiple simulations, thus duplicating the statistics to be found 
in the real world.
Now, even though it is not physically realizable, I think the idea of such a 
computer program is perfectly well defined. So, let us imagine a superduper 
computer simulation of a part of the world. Consider first something “simple” 
– a bob on a spring on distant Sedna say. The simulation covers a restricted 
region of space and time (the programmer would set up “boundary conditions” 
representing the influence of the rest of the world), and must be defined solely 
in terms of the values of fundamental physical attributes over that region. The 
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programmer is not allowed to work with gross parameters such as the mass of 
the bob or the stiffness of the spring, or the gravitational force on Sedna, but 
must write her code in terms of the really basic physical entities involved. 
The mainstream view predicts that the output of this computer simulation, 
appropriately displayed, would reveal a bob bouncing up and down, suspended 
above Sedna’s desolate and frozen surface. Now up the ante. Imagine a simulation 
of a more complex situation, for example a father and child washing their dog, 
in their backyard on a lovely sunny day. Do you think the simulation would 
mimic the actual events? The mainstream view asserts that such a simulation 
would “re-generate” both the action of the pendulum and the behavior of the 
father, child and dog (along with tub, water, soap, sunlight, etc.).
This thought experiment allows us to characterize emergence. An emergent 
is anything – objects, processes, behavior, etc – that appears in the simulation 
that is not coded explicitly into it. For example, computer models of weather 
systems do not have any explicit code for tornadoes yet tornadoes nevertheless 
manage to turn up in the simulated weather. In Dennett’s (1981) famous 
example of the chess-playing program that tends to use its queen early, we 
have an emergent behavior. There is no “get-the-queen-out-early” code in 
the chess program.
Our old friend, emergence as trivial novelty appears when the emergents 
in the simulation exactly match what we find in the real world target of the 
simulation. Tornadoes are real features of the weather and the early use of the 
queen is a genuine aspect of chess play; and they appear in their simulations 
despite not being explicitly coded into it. This is a kind of predictability 
essentially similar to that found in the life world.
A stronger form of emergence, which we might call ontological or radical 
emergence, is revealed through events that either fail to appear in the 
simulation or diverge in behavior from their simulacra. To avoid the worry 
that our simulation fails simply because it depends upon an inaccurate account 
of the basic features it is attempting to simulate, let us just stipulate that 
the simulation is thus accurate (we are free to do this since we are assuming 
that the fundamental theory is the correct theory of basic physical reality). 
The definition of ontological emergence will involve the idea that the real 
world’s behavior will depart from that of the simulated world even though the 
simulation contains a fully accurate portrayal of the fundamental features of 
the simulated system.
This computational metaphor avoids one obvious difficulty of real world 
searches for ontological emergence. In the real world, scientific investigation 
involves the use of complex instruments that might themselves possess 
ontologically emergent features. Inside the computational environment however 
the only “causal” powers at work are the powers of the fundamental level of 
the simulation. This is because we have manufactured computers so that – no 
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matter what emergent properties they might possess as complex physical systems 
in their own right – they compute only the functions they are programmed to 
compute. If we code in only the laws governing quarks, leptons, exchange bosons 
and the four forces (with initial condition) then these are the only processes 
that will drive the simulation. This will not of course stop the simulation from 
exhibiting high level structure and high level causal interaction, but these will 
be guaranteed to be – within the simulation – merely trivially novel features.
The concept of ontological emergence can be illustrated within the game 
of life example. Suppose we were given some cellular automata grids and 
were allowed to watch them evolve with the object being to figure out the 
underlying rules which governed the system. It is also permitted that we set 
up initial conditions as we wish upon the grid and set the system in action. 
We are allowed to assume that all our samples conform to the same set of 
rules but of course we are not told what these are. The analogy with the goal 
of fundamental science and experimentation is clear. Now suppose that our 
initial investigation strongly supports the idea that we are simply watching an 
implementation of the game of life itself, with its three rules of birth, death and 
persistence. We set up a computer simulation of the game of life and compare 
our simulation with our target, but we notice that our simulation sometimes 
diverges from the evolution of the target.
Then we notice something odd. Whenever a glider appears and exists for 
more than 20 time steps it becomes invulnerable. Completely contrary to the 
standard laws of life and in total opposition to the fundamental principles of 
purely local action in the standard life world, the age of some configurations 
makes a difference in how the grid evolves. The natural response would be 
to look for some internal clock that kept track of the age of the life world – a 
“hidden variable” within each cell. But, in general, there is nothing incoherent 
in the idea that there is simply an emergent feature depending upon time. This 
would be ontological or radical emergence.
V. Perils and Paradoxes of the Mainstream
Overall, the mainstream view is a beautiful and grand vision of the universe. 
It aims to unify everything in the world across all of space and all of time. It 
accepts and celebrates the overwhelming complexity of emergent systems while 
organizing them into a magnificent hierarchy of structure, development and 
function. But it leaves no place for consciousness.
To try to be more precise about what is already an intuitively disturbing 
situation, there are three especially significant, and inter-related, problems 
that arise when we think about the integration of consciousness into the 
mainstream view. The first problem stems from the way in which mainstream 
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emergents stand as mere epistemic resources in our quest to understand the 
world. The difficulty is that while the mainstream view is happy to embrace a 
“layered” view of nature in which there is a set of levels of increasing complexity 
in natural systems, from atoms to molecules to crystals, cells, organisms, etc. 
these levels are no more than explanatory shorthand. No one disputes that 
high level features are indispensable to our understanding of the world. The 
issue is whether high level features are, so to speak, part of nature’s own way of 
structuring the dynamics of the world. So far as the mainstream view can discern, 
the drivers of the world are all, solely and entirely the fundamental features. 
While it would be wrong to say that high level features are mind dependent 
in the sense that without minds there would be no high level structure, it is 
absolutely correct to say that that high level features play no role in the world 
except as apprehended by minds. Until and unless some high level feature is 
taken up in conscious perception and thought by some cognitive agent, that 
high level feature stands as a merely potential epistemological resource for 
such agents.
If consciousness is an emergent within the purview of the mainstream view 
then it must similarly be no more than such a potential epistemic resource. 
This flies in the face of our introspective awareness of our own consciousness 
as something that is an occurrent, robustly ontologically solid, existent. In fact, 
we are more certain of the existence of consciousness than anything else, and a 
good deal more certain of it than we are of the mainstream view, which seems 
to demote consciousness to a kind of potential existence dependent upon the 
explanatory practices of other conscious beings.
The second problem is that the mainstream view makes conscious 
experience entirely epiphenomenal. This is because all high level emergents 
are epiphenomenal under the mainstream view. It is important to be clear 
about what this means. It would be evidently absurd to deny that hurricanes 
can wreak havoc, but that is not what is intended by my claim that the 
mainstream view entails that hurricanes are epiphenomenal. What I mean is 
that hurricanes don’t cause anything in virtue of being hurricanes; the high 
winds inside a hurricane don’t cause anything in virtue of being “high winds”. 
Hurricaniness, if you will pardon the expression, does exactly nothing in the 
world’s dynamics. But the concept of a hurricane is extremely useful to us 
in organizing experience as well as in explaining and predicting events. All 
the causal work is performed by the fundamental physics that underlie those 
complex systems that we, as epistemic agents, usefully categorize as hurricanes. 
This picture of the place of consciousness in the world is profoundly at odds 
with our current understanding of the role of consciousness. Each of the forms 
of consciousness that I cataloged at the beginning of this paper appears to us 
as possessing a distinctive and genuine causal efficacy. The way the pain feels 
– the conscious experience of it – surely matters to how we behave and in fact 
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The third problem is that the mainstream view’s treatment of high level 
structure or emergent features generates a kind of paradox when applied to 
consciousness itself. The paradox is that if consciousness is just another high 
level feature of the world it stands as a mere epistemic potentiality until it is 
taken up and categorized as consciousness by some other cognitive agent who 
finds this categorization explanatorily or predictively useful. But my current 
consciousness is a fact about the world that is not at all merely potential and 
would persist as a fact even if all other consciousnesses were, this instant, 
obliterated. Perhaps the problem can also be expressed as a kind of vicious 
regress. The explanatory standpoints that take high level features beyond 
their mere epistemic potentiality are properties of conscious beings, but if 
conscious beings are themselves no more than high level features, then they 
require standpoints for them to go beyond mere epistemic potentiality. Each 
standpoint, as a high level feature, requires a conscious appreciation of it to 
transcend mere potentiality, but if consciousness itself is a high level feature 
then each consciousness requires a further consciousness to appreciate it. 
This vicious regress, or paradox, does not arise for any other of the high level 
features of the world that fit into their roles as epistemic resources smoothly 
and without complaint.
Thus another way to put the problem is to note that the mainstream view, 
contrary to appearances, subtly presupposes consciousness in its account of 
emergence. The layered view of reality that it endorses only makes sense if 
there are conscious beings around to appreciate all the high level structures, 
and their inter-relations, which can be discerned from various viewpoints. 
Without the viewpoints, the high level structure is completely otiose, playing 
no role in the intrinsic dynamics of the world.
The paradox is unavoidable, so long as the mainstream view forms the basis 
of our understanding of the universe. But the paradox is intolerable because it 
leaves a gaping hole in the metaphysical picture that stems from the mainstream 
view, undercutting the claim of completeness which is one of the main principles 
and supposed virtues of the mainstream view itself.
I can only give the merest sketch here of a few possible responses to this 
paradox. Two of them are rather hoary metaphysical standbys; one seems to 
me a rather different approach. None of them are altogether attractive.
In the face of the paradox of consciousness, we could modify the mainstream 
view in a way that retains some of its core principles. The ancient doctrine of 
panpsychism asserts that mind is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the 
world. This of course eliminates the problem of emergence. Since consciousness 
has been around always and everywhere it does not emerge out of radically non-
mental precursors. But panpsychism faces many difficulties. One is simply the 
intuitive implausibility of the idea that everything – electrons, chairs, planets, 
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etc–– partakes of mentality.  A more principled objection to panpsychism is 
that even if we grant that the ultimate constituents of things are in some sense 
conscious, or proto-conscious, or however we might like to express it, we face 
the problem of moving from the individual minds of the constituents to the 
conscious experience of the composites formed from them. Evidently, we face 
here a kind of emergence whose explanation may be no less intractable than 
the emergence we are supposed to be rejecting.
If emergence is unavoidable, then perhaps we should embrace it “whole hog”. 
Thus, another response to the paradox is radical emergence. This entails that 
complete rejection of the mainstream view. In particular, it entails that the 
models of fundamental science are empirically inadequate – that fundamental 
physics cannot provide a model in which all phenomena are correctly predicted. 
This is a bold claim and also a decidedly odd one insofar as radical emergence 
accepts both that fundamental physics can describe the elementary features of 
the world accurately and that all emergents appear as a matter of law entirely 
dependent upon these elementary features.
The final approach to the paradox I will consider depends upon a distinction 
between the empirical aspirations of science and the metaphysical hopes placed 
in science by philosophers and, perhaps, implicit in the mainstream view 
itself. The alternative view, which I call “surface metaphysics”, questions the 
distinctively 20th century idea that science is the leader on the quest towards 
ultimate reality. In fact, it suggests to the contrary that “ultimate reality” is 
staring us all in the face, and that conscious beings are a part of it that does 
not need to be “explained” by fundamental physics in the sense demanded 
by the mainstream view. This does not mean that science has nothing to 
say about consciousness. Far from it. Science can investigate the empirical 
conditions that underlie consciousness and of course already has amassed a 
huge amount of knowledge about the relation between brain and consciousness. 
But perhaps the idea that science can go behind the world we experience to 
find its metaphysical “foundation” is a mistake – an error that reflection on 
consciousness itself reveals.
University of Toronto at Scarborough
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Footnotes
1  For a careful discussion of Helmholtz’s notion of‘unconscious inference’ 
see Hatfield (2002).
2 Any number of implementations of the game of life can be found on 
the internet. Here’s one: http://www.bitstorm.org/gameoflife/.
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